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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

ISAAC l\IcDONALD,

Case No.
12534

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the conviction of Isaac McDonald for the crime of second degree burglary in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-3 (Supp. 1969).
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
Isaac McDonald was convicted on March 31, 1971,
of the crime of second degree burglary in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-3 (Supp. 1969). The Honorable
Allen B. Sorensen, Judge, Fourth Judicial District Court,
presided.

BELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that this Court should affirm
the
Court's verdict.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State adopts McDonald's statement of facts,
except as hereinafter set forth.
Francis S. Lundell testified that included in the items
stolen from his home were a rifle, a shotgun, and a
wallet. Mr. Lundell also testified that the camper located at his residence had been damaged as someone had
attempted to break and enter it (T. 27-30).
Ruth Bethers testified that Isaac McDonald was in
her home about noon of December 21, 1970. McDonald
had two wallets and was removing cards from them. Mrs.
Bethers was unable to positively identify plaintiff's Exhibit 3, as one of the wallets, but she did remember one
was brown and the other black (T. 9). When asked by another person present if that was where he got the wallets,
l\kDonald said, "Yes". Later McDonald said there was
a truck and camper down there he was going to have too
9-10).

er.

Mrs. Bethers testified that later in the day, McDonald, Joe and Danny Carter came to Mrs. Bethers' home.
Larry Carter joined them and they left for about 45 minutes; they returned at approximately 6: 30 p.m. When
they returned they had a rifle which Larry Carter
brought into the house. Mrs. Bethers identified plain·

•)

tJ

tiff;:; Exhibit 1 as the rifle brought into her home (T. 13)
nnd lH :,er
Lundell identified Exhibit 1 as the rifle
stolen from his home (T. 27-28). Ruth Bethers further
that the following day McDonald and the Carter
brothers were at her home and Archie Thompson drove
the rifle was next seen by Mrs. Bethers as Archie
Thompson put it into his car (T. 15).
\Villiam Albert Carter testified he went with McDonald and Joe and Danny Carter to the Lundell resi-

dence on December 22, 1970 to try to find Danny's
drivers license. William Carter testified that McDonald
of a house they had gotten into the day before, and
while looking for the license they stole an electric drill
from Lundell's residence. The witness also testified that
McDonald was present when the rifle and shotgun were
sold to Archie Thompson (T. 33-34).
The witness, Larry Carter, testified McDonald and
Danny had a rifle, shotgun, television and a couple of
outboard motors (T. 43) which they had taken from the
Lundell residence. Larry Carter said he kept the rifle
that night and when McDonald and his brothers came
over the following day, he told them he didn't want it
and about that time Archie Thompson came and purchased it (T. 44).
Following a full trial McDonald was convicted of second degree burglary and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of one to twenty years.
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POINT I.
DEFENDANT WHO FA.ILED TO TAKE EXCEPTION TO THE GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS
OR TO REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS ON THE
LAW OF ACCOl'v1PLICES CANNOT RAISE
ISSUE OF COURT'S FAILURE TO SO INSTRUCT ON APPEAL.
McDonald made no request for an instruction on the
testimony of the alleged accomplice, Larry Carter, and
made no objection when the court failed to give such an
instruction, therefore, l\.1cDona1d should not be pe1mitted
to raise the issue for the first time on appeal.
In State v. Scott, 22 Utah 2d 27, 28, 447 P. 2d 908
( 1968) the court s8.ys:
"The appellant raises the issue of the failure
to instruct on the law of an accomplice for the
first time in his brief. He made no request of the
trial court for such an instruction, nor did he take
any exception to the failure of the court to so
instruct. Even if the evidence had warranted such
an instruction, it does not seem proper that he
could abide the return of a possibly favorable verdict at the hands of the jury and at the same time
retain an 'ace in the hole' to cause this court to
give him a new trial in the case of an adverse decision." See State v. Blea, 20 Utah 2d 133, 434
P. 2d 446 (1967); State v. Owens, 15 Utah 2d
123, 388 P. 2d 797 (1964) ; State v. Dubois, 98
Utah 234, 98 P. 2d 354 (1940).
It is recognized that there may be exceptional circumstances when errors not excepted to are so dearly
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erroneous and prejudicial to the fundamental rights of
an accused that an appellate court of its own accord will
take notice thereof, but no such exceptional circumstances
exist in McDonald's appeal.
On this appeal, McDonald alleges that his motion
for a directed verdict preserved his right to appeal. The
transcript shows, however, that McDonald failed to adequately advise the trial court on the point he now raises.
Counsel for M:cDonald made the following motion:
"Comes now the defendant and moves for a
directed verdict of not guilty in this case upon the
grounds and for the reason that the state -has not
submitted any corroborating evidence in this case
and in the judgment of defense counsel all of the
evidence that has been utilized and elicited
against the defendant has emanated from accomplices to the crime" (T. 71).
The counsel for McDonald first argued that Ruth
Bethers was an accomplice, but apparently dropped the
assertion. Next, counsel argued that Larry Carter was
an accomplice; after some discussion in which the trial
court pointed out that Larry Carter wasn't even bound
over on burglary charges (T. 71) and in which McDonald's counsel agreed that Larry Carter might only be
an accomplice to receiving stolen goods (T. 72) the trial
court denied the motion for a directed verdict (T. 72).
This is the only mention made to the court on the
matter. A reading of the transcript shows that McDonald's counsel failed to show how Larry Carter might be
an accomplice to the burglary and shows that McDon-

aq
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ald's counsel made no request that the issue of whether
Larry Carter was an accomplice be submitted to the jury
to determine as a matter of fact.

·when the trial court charged the jury, specific mention was made that the witne3s, William Albert Carter,
was an accomplice and his testimony required corroboration to convict McDonald (Instruction No. 12). In view
of this instruction, :McDonald should have asked for a
similar instruction on Larry Carter, if he really felt his
allegation of Larry Carter being an accomplice had merit.
As the court said in State v. Scott, supra,

"It does not seem proper that he could abide
the return of a possibly favorable verdict at the
hands of the jury and at the same time retain an
'ace in the hole' to cause this court to give him
a new trial in the case of an adverse decision."
POINT II.
THE STATE'S WITNESS, LARRY CARTER,
WAS NOT AN ACCOMPLICE AND NO INSTRUCT I 0 N TO THE JURY ON THE
NECESSITY FOR CORROBORATING HIS
TESTI1\10NY WAS NECESSARY.
McDonald alleges that Larry Carter, one of the
state's witnesses was an accomplice to the crime of second degree burglary, which crime McDonald was convicted, and therefore, his testimony under Utah Code
Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953) requires corroboration.
Utah has not defined an "accomplice" statutorily,
yet case lavv- has adequately delineated the term. Gen-
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erally, an accomplice refers to one who is or could be
charged as a principal with the defendant on trial. State
v. Davie, 121 Utah 184, 240 P. 2d 263 (1952); State v.
Bowman, 92 Utah 540, 70 P. 2d 458 (1937); State v.
Cragun, 85 Utah 149, 38 P. 2d 1071 (1934); State v.
Com!es, 74 Utah 94, 277 P. 203 (1929).
I\fore specifically the court in State v. Coroles, at
98, defined an accomplice in the words of 1 Wharton's
Crim. Ev. (10th ed.) § 440, p. 921.

"An accomplice is a person who knowingly,
voluntarily, and with common intent with the
principal offender, unites in the commission of the
crime. The co-operation in the crime must be real,
not merely apparent." (Emphasis added.)
Justice Cherry speaking for the court in State v.
Wade, 66 Utah 267, 269, 241 P. 838 (1925) said the essential characteristic of an accomplice is criminal guilt, and
the court in State v. Bowman, supra, further clarified
who an accomplice might be:
"One who could not be convicted of the crime
with which defendant is charged is not an accomplice, no matter how culpable his conduct in connection therewith may be." Id., at 548, citing 16
C. J. 673. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, essential elements of an accomplice are criminal intent and facts sufficient to show that the alleged
accomplice could be tried and convicted of the same crime
of which the defendant is convicted.
The trial transcript fails to disclose evidence sufficient to show that Larry Carter had criminal intent or

that he could have been tried or convicted of burglary
in the second degree.
"Whether a person is an accomplice depends
upon the facts in each particular case. That one
is an accomplice must be shown by proof. The
burden is on the defendant to show that a witness
for the state is an accomplice and this is usually
determined by the court as a matter of law."
State v. Bixby, 27 Wash. 2d 144, 177 P. 2d 689,
702 (1947).
McDonald has not shown that Larry Carter could
have been convicted, but rather the trial record discloses
the opposite, that Larry Carter could not have been convicted.
In reviewing and denying McDonald's motion for a
directed verdict (T. 71-72) the trial court was aware that
charges against Larry Carter had been dropped at his preliminary hearing (T. 47). The transcript discloses that
Larry Carter was not given immunity for testifying against
McDonald (T. 47); there is no evidence that Larry
Carter was aware of the plan to burglarize the home of
Fr:lncis Lundell; no evidence is shown that Larry Carter
had any intent to participate; and there is no evidence
that he aided or abetted in the commission of the crime
of second degree burglary. After reviewing the evidence,
the trial court in its discretion felt there was insufficient
evidence to even let the question of whether Larry
Carter was an accomplice go to the jury; therefore, he
n1led as a matter of law that the witness was not an
accomplice and denied the motion for a directed vrr<lict.

There was evidence to show Larry Carter was prescn t 'vhen the stolen goods were brought out of the house,
:rnd
one of the stolen rifles was in his possession for
a day following the burglary. This, at the most, would
mate him an accessory. And this state has long recognized that an accessory could not be an accomplice. See
People v. Chadwick, 7 Utah 134, 25 P. 737 (1891).
McDonald places great weight on the recent decision
of State v. Olsen, 21 Utah 2d 128, 441 P. 2d 707 (1968)
and alleges that the facts in Olsen are so similar to McDonald's conviction that the court should find Larry
Carter to be an accomplice as a matter of law. However,
several distinguishing facts are evident. In Olsen, both
witnesses, Hunt and Jones, were continually with Olsen
for about fifteen hours prior to and thirty hours after the
burglary. Hunt and Jones went with Olsen to his home
where a crowbar was obtained, which was later used to
break into the pharmacy. There was sufficient evidence
to find that Hunt and Jones planned the burglary and
had the necessary intent and there was sufficient evidence to indict and convict the witnesses as well as Olsen.
The state chose to grant immunity to Hunt and Jones
in order to make a stronger case against Olsen.
In the instant appeal there is no evidence that Larry
Carter planned or participated in the burglary, there is
evidence that charges were dismissed against him, and
that no promise of immunity was given Larry Carter.
Clearly, L::ixry Carter could not be found to be an accom11Hce as a matter of law, and so the court had no respon-
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sibility to give an instruction on corroboration concerning
Larry Carter's testimony.
Even if this Court finds the evidence to be conflicting as to whether the witness, Larry Carter, was an
accomplice and thus disagrees with the trial court's decision that as a matter of law lv1cDonald was not an accomplice, it is not error to fail to instruct the jury where
no instructions were requested and no exceptions were
taken to the instructions (see Point I). Also, where
there is sufficient corroborating evidence to suppo1t an
accomplice's testimony it is not prejudicial error to fail
to instruct on the law of accomplices. State v. Bixby,
supra.
Even if the Court finds the trial court errored in not
instructing the jury on the testimony of the alleged accomplice, Larry Carter, it was harmless error since there
is other credible evidence to corroborate the accomplices
and convict McDonald. Id. at 702, State v. Hall, 112
Utah 272, 186 P. 2d 970 (1947); State v. Johnson, 25
Utah 2d 160, 478 P. 2d 491 (1970); see also, Utah Code
Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953).
POINT Ill.
ADEQUATE INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE
WAS RECEIVED AT TRIAL TENDING TO
CONNECT McDONALD WITH THE BURGLARY TO CORROBORATE THE TESTIMONIES OF WILLIAM ALBERT CARTER
AND THE ALLEGED ACCOMPLICE, LARRY CARTER.

11

Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953) provides:

"A conviction shall not be had on the testimony of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated
by other evidence, which in itself and without the
aid of the testimony of the accomplice tends to
connect the def endant with the commission of
the oftense; and the corroboration shall not be
sufficient, if it merely shows the commission of
the offense or the circumstances thereof." (Emphasis added.)
The test of whether there is sufficient corroborating
evidence was set out in State v. Lay, 38 Utah 143, 146,
110 P. 986 (1910) and has been repeatedly followed.
"It is not essential . . . that the corroborative
evidence be sufficient of itself to support a verdict
of guilty; nor is it essential that the testimony
of the accomplice be corroborated on every material point. It is sufficient if the testimony of the
accomplice is corroborated as to some material
fact, and that the corroborative evidence in and
of itself, and 'without the aid of the testimony of
the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant
Yvith the commission of the offense'."

See also: State v. Baran, 25 Utah 2d 16, 474 P. 2d 728
(1970), and State v. Vigil, 123 Utah 495, 260 P. 2d 539
(19,53).
It is necessary to examine the evidence indepen<lfntly of the testimonies of William Albert Carter and
Larry Carter and see whether it meets the statutory
requirement of tending to implicate and connect the defendant with the commission of the burglary.
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Ruth Bethers testified that on December 21, 1970,
about noon, McDonald in the company of Danny Carter,
Joe Carter, Bill Bethers, Larry Carter and herself had
some wallets from which he was removing cards. When
asked by Larry Carter if that was where he got the wallets, McDonald said, "Yes" (T. 9). Francis Lundell testified that included in items stolen from his home was
a wallet (T. 25-26).
1\1rs. Bethers further testified that McDonald had
said there was a truck and camper down there that he
was going to have, too (T. 9, 10). Evidence was introduced that Francis Lundell had a camper located at his
residence and someone had attempted to pry the door
open and break into the camper (T. 27).
Mrs. Bethers testified that McDonald, Joe and
Danny Carter left and then returned later the same day
to her home. This time Larry Carter went with McDonald and Joe and Danny Carter; they were gone for about
forty-five minutes (T. 12) and all returned to Mrs.
Bethers' home at about 6: 30 p.m. Larry Carter got out
of the car and brought a rifle into Mrs. Bethers' home;
the rifle marked as plaintiff's Exhibit 1 was identified by
Mrs. Bethers as the one they returned with (T. 13) and
was later identified by Mr. Lundell as the one stolen
from his home (T. 28).
Mrs. Bethers testified that Larry Carter debated
what to do with the rifle, whether to take it back, or
whether to turn it over to the sheriff's office (T. 13).

December 22, 1970, 1\frs. Bethers testithat about noon McDonald and Joe, Danny, and
1
.7:11l8.rn Albert Carter drove up in front of her house (T.
J"1) and Larry Carter got the rifle and took it out to the
cB r in which McDonald and the Carter boys were sitting
(T. 14). About this time another car, driven by Archie
Thompson, pulled up behind them, and the next she saw
of the rifle was when Archie Thompson put it in his car
(T. 15).
(

Mrs. Bethers testified that she was instrumental in
recovering the rifle and shotgun, marked as Exhibit 2,
from Archie Thompson. The shotgun was, also, identified
by Mr. Lundell as one of the items taken during the burglary of his home (T. 28-29).
The statutory test of whether the evidence corroborates the testimony of an accomplice is that it must "tend
to connect the defendant with the commission of the
crime" Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953); this test is
met by the testimonies of Mr. Lundell and Mr. Bethers.
Mr. Lundell's testimony shows his home was burglarized and several items were stolen including the rifle,
shotgun, and wallets. Mr. Lundell's testimony also discloses he had a camper which had been damaged as someone attempted to break and enter it. Mrs. Bethers' testimony discloses that McDonald had two wallets and he
was planning on going back and getting a camper from
the same place, too.
Mr. Lundell testified he had a rifle stolen and the
stolen rifle was identified by Mrs. Bethers as the one
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which was in the presence of McDonald and the Carter
brothers as they returned to her home at 6: 30 p.m. December 2], 1970, and again the rifle was in presence of
McDonald and the Carter brothers before being purchased by Archie Thompson on December 22, 1970.
As was decided in State v. Park, 44 Utah 360, 140
P. 768 (1914), the facts and circumstances of the case,
if sufficiently cogent, may constitute cormboration to satisfy this rule; in State v. Frisby, 49 Utah 227, 162 P. 616
(1916) the court held that where many circumstances
directly point to defendant's guilt, independent of an
accomplice's testimony this is sufficient corroboration;
in State v. Bruner, 106 Utah 49, 145 P. 2d 302 (1944),
the court cited several cases as holding that corroboration is sufficient if it "implicates the accused in the
offense"; and in State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P. 2d
285 (1941), the court held that the evidence need not be
sufficient in itself to support a conviction, it may be
slight and entitled to little consideration.

It is submitted that McDonald seeks to place a much
higher standard for corroboration of an accomplice's testimony than the statute and case law apply. There is
sufficient evidence to corroborate the testimony of William Albert Carter and also the testimony of the alleged
accomplice, Larry Carter.

POINT IV.
THE COURT'S ORDER TO STRIKE THE
TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS BILL

"
j •)

£.2THERS, AND THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY TO IGNORE HIS TESTI1\10NY WERE SUFFICIENT AND NO
PREJUDICIAL EFFECT ACCRUED T 0
l'v1cDON ALD.
It is recognized that except in the most extraordi-

nary situations the erroneous admission of evidence is
not prejudicial where the court strikes the evidence and
instructs the jury to disregard it. State v. Gay, 6 Utah
2d 122, 307 P. 2d 885, cert. denied 78 S. Ct. 275, 355 U. S.
899, 2 L. Ed. 196 (1957), State v. Johnson, 79 Utah 263,
9 P. 2d 186 (1932), State v. Inlow, 44 Utah 485, 141 P.
530 (1914).
McDonald's allegation, that the striking of the testjmony of Bill Bethers and the instruction to ignore the
testimony are insufficient to overcome the prejudicial
effect, is without merit.
Nearly everything testified to by Bill Bethers was
contained in the testimony of Ruth Bethers. Both Ruth
and Bill Bethers testified McDonald had two wallets in
his possession and both testified he was pulling cards
out of the wallets. Bill Bethers testified he saw the name
"Lundell" on a card (T. 21) and after Bill testified he
could identify the wallets if he saw them, McDonald's
counsel sought and received permission to voir dire the
witness (T. 21).
The examination determined that Bill Bethers had
been drinking and the motion of McDonald's counsel,
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that his testimony be stricken on the basis that anything
he said is subject to doubt, was granted by the trial court
who then found the witness in contempt. The court then
inr.tructed the jufy:
"Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you ur:
derstand that I have ordered his testimonv
stricken. You are to ignore anything that he said
in court here today" (T. 23).
Clearly the trial court was in a good position to judge
the effect of the intoxicated Bill Bethers' testimony. The
competency of a witness is a matter for the trial court's
determination and the Supreme Court will not interfere
with the sound discretion of the trial judge unless he
has clearly abused his discretion. State v. Zeezich, 61
Utah 61, 210 P. 927 (1922). The trial court could determine whether Bethers' testimony was so prejudicial
that an instruction to ignore it would be insufficient.
After viewing the effect of Bethers' testimony the trial
court's decision was that an instruction to ignore the
testimony was sufficient.
McDonald made no motion for a new trial based on
the prejudicial effect of Bill Bethers' testimony and his
motion for a directed verdict did not refer to any incureable prejudice resulting from the stricken testimony. The
state further submits that McDonald's failure to present
this issue to the trial court waives his right to raise it on
appeal. State v. Kinder, 14 Utah 2d 199, 381 P. 2d 82
(1963).
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The defendant relies on State v. Nichols, 106 Utah
104, 145 P. 2d 802 (1944) to illustrated that in extraordinary situations a motion to strike and an instruction
to ignore testimony are insufficient. But Nichols is distinguished in that the erroneously introduced evidence
was clearly hearsay and it was the only evidence which
connected Nichols to the crime for which he was convicted. This lack of evidence connecting Nichols with
the crime was relied on in reversing his conviction and
remanding the case. As the court said:
"We hold that this appeal is well taken on
the grounds urged and that there is not sufficient
evidence connecting appellant with the commission of the crime of burglary with which he stood
charged to support the verdict of the jury." Id.,
at 113.
The present transcript shows sufficient evidence to
convict McDonald besides the stricken testimony of Bill
Bethers and the jury's verdict should not be overturned
since there was sufficient evidence to justify their findmgs.
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CONCLUSION
The State respectfully submits that the lower court's
decision should be affirmed. McDonald was given a fair
and impartial trial. The transcript discloses no errors of
law requiring a reversal of the verdict. Therefore, respondent respectfully submits that the jury verdict and
conviction in the district court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

